North Carolina\u27s Emergency Measures to Reduce Home Foreclosures by Waldrep, Carolyn E.
NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 13 | Issue 1 Article 22
2009
North Carolina's Emergency Measures to Reduce
Home Foreclosures
Carolyn E. Waldrep
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Carolyn E. Waldrep, North Carolina's Emergency Measures to Reduce Home Foreclosures, 13 N.C. Banking Inst. 453 (2009).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol13/iss1/22
North Carolina's Emergency Measures to Reduce Home
Foreclosures'
I. INTRODUCTION
To avoid as many as 25,000 foreclosures on subprime loans
in the state over the next two years, North Carolina passed
foreclosure prevention legislation.2 The Emergency Program to
Reduce Home Foreclosure Act (Act),3 which went into effect on
November 1, 2008, is too new to judge how effectively it will
reduce foreclosures across the state before it expires on October
31, 2010. The Act raises many issues: how does it benefit
homeowners who are facing foreclosure? How does it benefit
lenders whose debtors have defaulted? How does the Act differ
from and coordinate with similar legislation passed in other states
and by the federal government?
This Note will analyze the benefits and drawbacks of the
Act and compare it to similar programs in other jurisdictions. Part
II of the Note will discuss the foreclosure emergency that North
Carolina faces.4 Part III will detail the provisions of the Act, with
attention to the new pre-foreclosure filing requirements and the
State Home Foreclosure Prevention Project, as well as the
additional requirements and responsibilities that the Act gives to
the North Carolina Office of the Commissioner of Banks
(NCOCOB). 5 Part IV will analyze the ways in which the Act
1. Full disclosure: the author of this Note is a trained volunteer for the State
Home Foreclosure Prevention Project, a project created by the Act analyzed in this
Note. In September, 2008, the author attended six hours of training.
2. Press Release, N.C. Office of the Governor, Gov. Easley Signs Bills to Help
Citizens Avoid Home Foreclosures: First of its Kind Program Aims to Drastically
Reduce North Carolina Foreclosure Actions (Aug. 18, 2008), http://www.governor.
state.nc.us/News/PressReleases/Default.asp (follow "August 2008" drop-down boxes;
then follow "Aug. 18: FULL STORY" hyperlink).
3. Emergency Program to Reduce Home Foreclosures Act, ch. 226, 2008 N.C.
Sess. Laws (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-100) [hereinafter N.C. Act].
4. Id. The preamble states: "Whereas, it will benefit both borrowers and lenders
in the State of North Carolina if every effort is made to bring the parties together to
seek solutions and avoid foreclosures." See infra notes 9-71 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 72-96 and accompanying text.
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benefits homeowners and mortgage lenders, including a
comparison of the Act to similar programs in other states.6 Part V
will discuss the interrelation of the Act with present and proposed
federal legislation, voluntary efforts at foreclosure prevention by
lenders, and the possibility of preemption by federal law.7 Finally,
Part VI will conclude that the Act carefully balances the
competing interests of homeowners and mortgage lenders,
benefiting both parties and making federal preemption less likely.
8
II. THE FORECLOSURE EMERGENCY IN NORTH CAROLINA
A. The Role of Subprime Loans in the Foreclosure Emergency
Subprime lending, described as the "democratization of
credit" by former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan,
offers the possibility of homeownership to borrowers whom
lenders consider more likely to default on their mortgages. 9 In a
subprime loan, a borrower offsets this credit risk by paying higher
interest rates.1° "In . . . its simplest form, what makes a loan
subprime is the existence of a premium above the prevailing prime
market rate that a borrower must pay.""
Homeowners often struggle to maintain payments on
subprime loans for the duration of their mortgages because of the
high interest rates.12 Many subprime loans are adjustable-rate
mortgages (ARMs), in which the interest rate starts at a low,
"teaser" level before resetting to a higher, fluctuating, market-
6. See infra notes 97-173 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 174-195 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 196-204 and accompanying text.
9. ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, LOSING
GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME MARKET AND THEIR COST TO
HOMEOWNERS 8 (2006), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/foreclosure-paper-
report-2-17.pdf.
10. Id. at 7. Accord James R. Hagerty, Foreclosures, Overdue Mortgages Increase
Again: Troubles Extent Into Prime Loans Via Option ARMs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 6,
2008, at A3.
11. Souphala Chomslsengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of
the Subprime Mortgage Market, FED. RES. BANK ST. Louis REV. 31, 36 (Jan./Feb.
2006), available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/06/01/ChomPenn
Cross.pdf.
12. SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 9, at 7.
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based rate a few years later. 3 As mortgage payments rise to the
fully-indexed rate (in extreme cases causing a forty percent
increase in the payment from their introductory rate), 14 borrowers
become less likely to repay the mortgage and more likely to
default.15 Most of the subprime loans that went into foreclosure by
early 2008 defaulted because they were already too expensive for
the homeowners even before the ARM interest rates had reset.
1 6
The increase in ARM interest rates has been "a driving factor" in
raising the default rate in prime loans,17 but the ARM has not yet
adjusted for many of the subprime loans." Borrowers are
becoming delinquent on subprime ARMs months and even years
in advance of the scheduled reset date.' 9 Since the ARMs are
causing many delinquencies at the introductory rate, ° when the
rates finally do increase, the foreclosure rate on subprime loans is
expected to get much higher.
The U.S. demand for subprime mortgages escalated around
the turn of the twenty-first century: $665 billion worth of subprime loans
were extended in 2005, up from $35 billion in 1994.21 The increase in
demand came not only from home buyers, but also from investors
around the world interested in investment vehicles backed by
bundles of mortgages in the U.S. housing market.22  The
13. Hagerty, supra note 10.
14. SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 9, at 26-27.
15. STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION WORKING GROUP, ANALYSIS OF
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE SERVICING PERFORMANCE: DATA REPORT NO. 1, at 11 (Feb.
2008), http://www.csbs.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Home/StateForeclosurePrevent
ionWorkGroupDataReport.pdf [hereinafter DATA REPORT No. 1].
16. Id. at 1, 11.
17. Hagerty, supra note 10.
18. DATA REPORT No. 1, supra note 15, at 1-2, 11.
19. STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION WORKING GROUP, ANALYSIS OF
SUBPRIME MORTGAGE SERVICING PERFORMANCE: DATA REPORT No. 3, at 4 (Sept.
2008), http://www.csbs.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Home/SFPWGReport3.pdf
[hereinafter DATA REPORT No. 3] (finding specifically that one-third "of the
subprime loans facing reset in the 3rd quarter of 2009 are already delinquent in May
2008, up from 29% in January 2008 and 22% in October 2007").
20. DATA REPORT No. 1,supra note 15, at 11.
21. SCHLOEMER ET AL., supra note 9, at 7. See also Chomslsengphet &
Pennington-Cross, supra note 11, at 37 (finding the development from $65 billion in
1995 to $332 billion in 2003, based on data from Inside B&C Lending).
22. This American Life: The Giant Pool of Money, Program #355 (PRI radio
broadcast May 9, 2008), available at http://www.thislife.org/Radio-Episode.aspx?epi
sode=355.
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investment vehicles combined various sorts of mortgages with
other investments and sold tranches to investors with small
percentages of each mortgage in the bundle. 3 Investors sought
tranches that included large amounts of the riskier subprime loans
because of their high interest rates combined with some highly-
rated investments with low interest rates for stability.24 The
demand for subprime mortgages was so strong that, as early as
2005, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the
regulator of national banks, noted the "clear trend toward easing
of underwriting standards as banks stretch for volume and yield"
25of mortgages.
Investors' demand for mortgage-backed securities has
dropped as home prices have fallen (often to less than the amount
of the outstanding mortgage),26 resulting in the current mortgage• • 27
crisis. Homeowners in default have been foreclosed upon,
costing the U.S. economy more than $300 billion by the end of
200728 and an estimated $500 billion by the middle of 2008.29
Foreclosure filings are continuing to rise across the country, with a
three percent increase from the second to third quarters of 2008,
and a seventy-one percent increase from the third quarter of 2007
to the third quarter of 2008.30 Economists anticipate that the trend
23. Id. Accord Jessica Holzer et al., FDIC's Bair Suggests Guarantees for Loans,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122477138431362499.html?
mod=rsswhats_ news-us (link no longer connects to this article; source on file with
Banking Journal).
24. This American Life, supra note 22.
25. NATIONAL CREDIT COMMITTEE, OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE
CURRENCY, 2005 SURVEY OF CREDIT UNDERWRITING PRACTICES (2005),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/2005Underwriting/CreditUnderwriting2005.htm.
26. See Where Homes Are Worth Less Than the Mortgage (multimedia interactive
map), N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.nytimes.comlinteractivel2008lll/lO/bus
iness/20081111_MORTGAGES.html.
27. This American Life, supra note 22.
28. MARK E. PEARCE, N.C. OFFICE OF THE COMMISSION OF BANKS, RISING
FORECLOSURES IN NORTH CAROLINA: HOUSE FORECLOSURE COMMITTEE, (Jan. 23,
2008), http://www.nccob.org/NR/rdonlyres/63F9E8B2-3FB4-4693-80BE-EC2931F6E7
00/0/HouseForeclosureCommitteeJanuary2008.pdf. Accord Holzer et al., supra note
23.
29. Email from Will Corbett, Staff Attorney, N.C. Office of Comm'r of Banks, to
potential volunteers for the State Home Foreclosure Prevention Project, UNC
School of Law, Duke Law, and NCCU School of Law (Oct. 21, 2008, 9:19 AM EST)
(on file with Banking Journal) [hereinafter Corbett Email].
30. David Benoit, Foreclosure Filings Rise 71%, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2008, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB122475248587362063.html.
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will continue to worsen, with expectations varying between two
million more to over four million more foreclosures from 2008 to
2010.31
While homeowners of all mortgage types have faced
foreclosure in the mortgage crisis, subprime loan holders are
32dramatically more likely to be affected. As of May 2008, over
300,000 subprime loans (constituting more than twenty-seven
percent of all seriously delinquent subprime loans) were in
foreclosure, compared with fewer than 80,000 prime loans (or
fifteen percent of all delinquent prime loans) that started
foreclosure proceedings by that date.33 Many of the borrowers
who funded their real estate purchases with subprime loans face an
extreme need for help to avoid foreclosure.
B. State Governments' Research on Subprime Mortgage
Foreclosures
The NCOCOB regulates most of the mortgage lenders in
North Carolina by granting licenses to over one thousand
mortgage companies, including "8 of the top 20 mortgage lenders"
in the state. 4 Reacting to the foreclosure emergency in 2007,
representatives of the NCOCOB and the North Carolina Attorney
General joined with colleagues in ten other states to create the
State Foreclosure Prevention Working Group (Working Group).35
31. PEARCE, supra note 28.
32. DATA REPORT No. 1, supra note 15. See generally Hagerty, supra note 10
(discussing foreclosures on prime borrowers).
33. DATA REPORT No. 3, supra note 19, at Appendix 4-5. See also OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY & OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, OCC AND OTS
MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT: DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL BANK AND FEDERAL
THRIFT MORTGAGE LOAN DATA, JANUARY-JUNE 2008, at 9 (U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury ed., Sept. 2008), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2008-
105a.pdf (reporting that, in the first half of 2008, the percentage of all mortgage loans
regulated by national banks and federal thrifts that were seriously delinquent was
between two and three percent each month, whereas between ten and twelve percent
of subprime loans were seriously delinquent).
34. PEARCE, supra note 28.
35. DATA REPORT No. 1, supra note 15, at 4; STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION
WORKING GROUP, ANALYSIS OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE SERVICING PERFORMANCE:
DATA REPORT No. 2 (Apr. 2008), http://www.csbs.org/Content/NavigationMenu/
Home/StateForeclosureApril2008.pdf [hereinafter DATA REPORT No. 2]; DATA
REPORT No. 3, supra note 19 (noting the participation in the Working Group of
Arizona, California, Colorado, Iowa, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio and
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The Working Group studies "unnecessary" foreclosures:
those where delinquent borrowers have not abandoned the home
but are actively trying to pay, and where lenders benefit from
renegotiating instead of foreclosing on the home.36 The Working
Group's findings suggest that the best potential solution for the
foreclosure crisis is to make renegotiation a viable alternative to
foreclosure. 3  Renegotiation is often the best solution for both
lenders and borrowers; otherwise, in foreclosure, homeowners are
forced to move, and lenders can lose up to forty percent of the
value of the mortgage.38  But renegotiation is particularly
challenging for subprime loans that have been divided up into
securities: they no longer have just one owner.39  Instead,
borrowers often deal with mortgage servicers, the organizations
who receive the homeowners' payments.4n Servicers are often not
as motivated to renegotiate as the homeowners or a direct lender
41would be. In fact, some have a financial disincentive to
renegotiate because they are often paid double the standard fee
for servicing a loan in default. 4' As a result, while some servicers
report renegotiating with forty percent of their delinquent
borrowers, others report renegotiating with as few as ten percent.43
The Working Group found that neither party is currently
taking full advantage of the renegotiation process." In September
2008, they reported that over three-quarters of borrowers facing
foreclosure are not in renegotiations with lenders.45  Those
delinquent homeowners who manage to keep their homes do so by
Texas (each represented by the state Attorney General); New York (represented,
like North Carolina, by the state Attorney General and state bank regulators); and
the Conference of State Bank Supervisors).
36. DATA REPORT No. 1, supra note 15, at 4.
37. Id.
38. Press Release, N.C. Office of the Governor, supra note 2.
39. Holzer et al., supra note 23.
40. Steven Seidenberg, Homing in on Foreclosure, A.B.A. J., July 2008, at 54, 58.
41. Id. See also John D. Geanakoplos & Susan P. Koniak, Op-Ed., Mortgage
Justice is Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2008, at A39, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2008/10/30/opinion/30geanakoplos.html?scp=l&sq=mortgage% 20justice%20is
%20blind&st=cse (recommending a government-sponsored trustee instead of a
servicer to renegotiate mortgages that have been split into investment securities).
42. Seidenberg, supra note 40, at 58.
43. DATA REPORT NO. 3, supra note 19, at 11.
44. See DATA REPORT NO. 1, supra note 15.
45. DATA REPORT No. 3, supra note 19, at 2, 7.
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independently finding ways to catch up on their arrears, despite
46the onerous terms of their mortgages. Lenders, recognizing that
47they can gain more by renegotiating loans than foreclosing, are
willing to modify the loans, or permit servicers to modify for them,
sixty-five percent of the time.48  Renegotiation may involve
modification, where the terms of the loan are changed
permanently (e.g., to lower the interest rate or principal due) or
the creation of a payment plan, where the delinquent payments are
rescheduled (either during the life of the loan or added to the end)
but the original terms of the loan are generally intact.49
Modifications are generally more beneficial to troubled
homeowners, and lenders appear increasingly likely to offer loan
modifications instead of payment plans. °
Even though modifying a mortgage loan can be in the best
interests of both parties overall, it is not a perfect solution.5' The
Working Group found that twenty percent of homeowners who
renegotiated their mortgage loans also defaulted under the new
terms,52 and others in the mortgage industry claim that the
recidivism rate is as high as fifty percent.53 The Working Group
46. Id. at 7; DATA REPORT NO. 1, supra note 15, at 2, 13.
47. Press Release, North Carolina Attorney General, Hotline to help North
Carolinians facing foreclosure (Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.ncdoj.com/DocumentSt
reamerClient?directory=PressReleases/&file=foreclosure%20assistance%20hotline.
pdf. See also OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 33, at 12
(finding, from a collection of information on loss mitigation from the institutions with
the most mortgage servicing, which included nine national banks and five federal
thrifts, that there was an increase nationwide in lenders helping homeowners mitigate
their loss instead of foreclosing, with over 250,000 loss mitigation plans started in the
first half of 2008 alone).
48. DATA REPORTNo. 2, supra note 35, at 2. This 65% rate in January 2008 is an
increase from 45% as of October 2007. Accord DATA REPORT No. 1, supra note 15, at
1, 12.
49. Mike Ferullo, HOPE NOW Reports Record Number of Loan Modifications,
Repayment Plans, Banking Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 4, 2008).
50. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 33, at 3. Loan
modifications represented approximately 33% of all loss mitigation actions in
January 2008 and almost 50% of all loss mitigation actions by June 2008. Accord
DATA REPORT No. 2, supra note 35, at 2; DATA REPORT No. 3, supra note 19, at 8.
51. Kate Berry, Why Foreclosure Relief Worries Many Servicers, AMERICAN
BANKER, Nov. 5, 2008, § Mortgages, at 1, available at http://www.americanbanker.
com/article.html?id=20081104WSJ8UA22&queryid=1137336523&hitnum=l.
52. DATA REPORT No. 3, supra note 19, at 3.
53. Berry, supra note 51 (quoting Fred Cannon of Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Inc., who
states "It's well known within the industry that modified loans have a recidivism rate of 50%.").
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blames the recidivism on ineffective, "band-aid modifications" that
are not reducing the homeowners' payments or addressing the
crisis." Although lenders receive less profit on the renegotiated
loan than they would under the terms of the original mortgage,
and although some debtors continue to default, lenders benefit
from good-faith renegotiation because they would typically lose
even more if they were to foreclose on the home.55
However, even though renegotiation would be in the best
interests of both the borrowers and the lenders, they are not
coming together to renegotiate most of the mortgages facing
foreclosure.56 Lawmakers can potentially avoid more unnecessary
foreclosures if they can find a way to unite lenders and
homeowners for renegotiation.
C. The Act as North Carolina's Response to the Foreclosure
Emergency
North Carolina has a history of creating laws to protect
homeowners and other borrowers against abusive credit
58practices. This has helped to keep the foreclosure rate in North
Carolina lower than the national average: 59 North Carolina has
fewer subprime loans, non-traditional mortgages, adjustable rate
loans, and mortgage fraud than most states. ° Specifically, North
Carolina is "4 5 1h in [the] nation in concentration of subprime
lending in 2005" and "3 3rd out of 44 reporting states [on mortgage
fraud] in 2006. ' ,61 Despite the state's careful consumer protection
54. DATA REPORT No. 3, supra note 19, at 9-10.
55. Geanakoplos & Koniak, supra note 41.
56. See DATA REPORT No. 1, supra note 15.
57. See id.
58. PEARCE, supra note 28; accord Corbett Email, supra note 29. North
Carolina's consumer protection laws include the Predatory Lending Act of 1999, N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E; Act of Aug. 29, 2001, ch. 393, 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws (codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-243.01 (2007)) (regulating mortgage brokers and bankers); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2 (prohibiting "flipping"); N.C. GEN. STAT. §244.11(defining "rate
spread loans"); Act to Regulate Mortgage Servicing ch. 228, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws (to be
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-243.01); and N.C. Act, supra note 3.
59. PEARCE, supra note 28; Press Release, North Carolina Attorney General,
supra note 47.
60. PEARCE, supra note 28 (stating that "Strong Laws and Balanced Growth have
reduced NC's susceptibility to crisis").
61. Id.
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and the relatively low level of foreclosures in North Carolina, the
rate of foreclosures in North Carolina is climbing.62  The
foreclosure rate in 2007 was up 9.4% over the 2006 rate, and the
NCOCOB anticipates that in 2008, the foreclosure rate in North
Carolina will rise by an additional twenty percent, with as many as
60,000 foreclosure starts in the state, as the overall economy
63worsens.
The NCOCOB noted in early 2008 that, compared to other
states, "[p]ro-active legislation and balanced growth have put NC
in [a] good position to weather [the] foreclosure storm. '
Nonetheless, North Carolina actively has sought to avoid
unnecessary foreclosures through negotiation and counseling with
homeowners. In February 2008, the Attorney General's office
created a telephone hotline to provide defaulting homeowners
with free counseling about foreclosure avoidance options.65 The
NCOCOB asked the North Carolina General Assembly to
respond to the impending foreclosure crisis, beginning in April
2008 with a hearing before the House Select Committee on Rising
Foreclosures. 66 The state worked with community groups and
mortgage industry leaders to create the principles to guide its
future actions.67  These principles include: improving
communication between homeowners and lenders, encouraging
renegotiations without requiring them, focusing efforts on "willing
homeowners who have a realistic possibility of retaining their
homes," and avoiding a foreclosure moratorium. 6' Based on these
principles, the NCOCOB asked the General Assembly to support
more homeowner counseling programs and to "[t]emporarily
increase judicial review of foreclosures for certain types of
subprime or non-traditional loans originated in 2005-2007. ,69 The
General Assembly responded by filing in late May 2008 the bill
62. Id.; Press Release, North Carolina Attorney General, supra note 47.
63. PEARCE, supra note 28; accord Corbett Email, supra note 29.
64. PEARCE, supra note 28.
65. Press Release, North Carolina Attorney General, supra note 47.
66. Corbett Email, supra note 29.
67. Id.
68. Will Corbett, Staff Attorney, N.C. Office of the Comm'r of Banks, Speech on
State Home Foreclosure Prevention Project at UNC School of Law (Oct. 21, 2008)
[hereinafter Corbett Speech].
69. PEARCE, supra note 28.
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that would become the Act; it was enacted into law in August
2008.' ° By September 2008, North Carolina's default notices
dropped sixty-six percent.7'
III. NORTH CAROLINA'S PASSAGE OF THE EMERGENCY PROGRAM
TO REDUCE HOME FORECLOSURES ACT
As Governor Mike Easley explained, "[o]ur goal is to help
borrowers and lenders together so that the family gets to keep
their home and the bank does not lose money on the loan. 7 2 The
Act seeks to achieve this in two main ways. First, it requires
lenders to provide written notices to homeowners forty-five days
ahead of filing for foreclosure on subprime loans, and to file such
notices electronically with the North Carolina court system.73
Second, it encourages homeowners and lenders to renegotiate the
mortgage during the forty-five day delay, which the NCOCOB
may extend for thirty additional days.74
The Act, which is effective between November 1, 2008 and
October 31, 2010,"5 applies only to subprime loans, defined as a
residential mortgage created in 2005, 2006 or 2007 that would
qualify as a rate spread home loan.76 According to the North
Carolina General Statutes, a rate spread home loan on a first
mortgage has an annual percentage rate at least 1.75 percentage
points above the prevailing market interest rate (based on Freddie
Mac mortgage commitment data published weekly in the Federal
Reserve Board's Statistical Release H.15) and at least three
percent greater than the yield on U.S. Treasury securities (based
on the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act triggers).77
70. N.C. Act, supra note 3.
71. Benoit, supra note 30.
72. Press Release, N.C. Office of the Governor, supra note 2.
73. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1; accord Corbett Email, supra note 29.
74. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1; Press Release, N.C. Office of the Governor, supra
note 2.
75. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 6.
76. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1.
77. Id. (defining subprime loans as those created at any point in years 2005, 2006
and 2007 that "would meet the definition of a rate spread home loan under G.S. 24-
1.1F(a)(7), if that section had been in effect when the loan was originated.") N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1F(a)(7) also includes mortgages for subordinate liens as those
that both are 3.75 percentage points above the prevailing market interest rate and
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A. The Notice and Filing Requirements in the Act
The Act requires that a pre-foreclosure notice be sent to
borrowers of subprime loans forty-five days prior to the filing of a
notice of hearing.78 The notice must supply the homeowner with
the amount past due, the total amount required to bring the loan
current, information on "the availability of resources to avoid
foreclosure," and contact data for the borrower's mortgage lender
and/or mortgage servicer, counseling agencies within the state, and
the NCOCOB." Then, within three business days, creditors must
submit information on the loan electronically to the state to be
compiled in a nonpublic database. 8° The NCOCOB may request
additional information on the loan "to prioritize efforts to reach
borrowers most likely to avoid foreclosure and to prevent delay
for defaults where foreclosure is unavoidable."81
B. The Role of the North Carolina Office of the Commissioner
of Banks in the Act
The Act grants additional rights, powers, and
responsibilities to the NCOCOB. First, the NCOCOB will
establish and run the State Home Foreclosure Prevention Project
(Project)82 with input from representatives from homeowner
groups as well as the mortgage industry. The Act states that "the
purpose of the Project is to seek solutions to avoid foreclosures for
certain subprime loans. 83 Because the NCOCOB has discovered
that many subprime loans in North Carolina violate state and
federal laws, a key component of the Project will be the legal
review of thousands of subprime loans.* The Project uses
NCOCOB paralegals and trained legal volunteers, including law
have an annual percentage rate at least five percent greater than the yield on U.S.
Treasury securities. Accord Memorandum from the N.C. Bankers Ass'n to the Legal
Memorandum Mailing List (Sept. 10, 2008) (on file with BankingJoumal).
78. N.C. Act, supra note 3, §§ 1-2.
79. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.; Corbett Email, supra note 29.
83. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1.
84. Corbett Email, supra note 29.
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students, all subject to a confidentiality agreement, to begin the85
process. They enter the values from the NCOCOB database into
a computer program that indicates whether the terms of a given
loan exhibit "red flags" (because the terms approach violations of
North Carolina's or federal lending laws) for further review by the
NCOCOB staff.86 Then NCOCOB attorneys conduct an extensive
legal compliance review of the flagged loans to determine whether
there are violations, and if so, to engage in conversations with the
mortgage servicer, the licensed entity, and a housing counselor to
87remedy the violation. In cases of egregious violations, the
NCOCOB can bring a suit to enforce the disgorgement of certain
terms in a mortgage or revoke illegal terms entirely.8  In addition
to the legal review process, the Project has a consumer education
component, including a media campaign on television and the
internet.
9
Second, after analyzing a loan, if the NCOCOB determines
that the loan is "appropriate for efforts to avoid foreclosure," and
that "further efforts by the State Home Foreclosure Prevention
Project offer a reasonable prospect to avoid foreclosure on
primary residences," the NCOCOB has the power to extend the
foreclosure process one time for thirty days.9°
The third requirement for the NCOCOB is to report on the
program's effectiveness and recommendations to the General
Assembly before May 1 in 2009 and 2010.91 The Act creates an
additional reporting requirement for the State Banking
Commission, obliging it to report on the program's
implementation to the Joint Legislative Commission on
85. Will Corbett, Staff Attorney, N.C. Office of the Comm'r of Banks, Student
Volunteer Training for the State Home Foreclosure Prevention Project at UNC
School of Law (Sept. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Training].
86. Id.; Email from Will Corbett, Staff Attorney, N.C. Office of Comm'r of
Banks, to potential volunteers for the State Home Foreclosure Prevention Project,
UNC School of Law, Duke Law, and NCCU School of Law (Sept. 24, 2008, 3:30 PM
EST) (on file with Banking Journal).
87. Training, supra note 85.
88. Corbett Speech, supra note 68.
89. Corbett Email, supra note 29.
90. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1.
91. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 5.
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Governmental Operations by February 15, 2009, less than four
months after the Act takes effect.92
C. Funding of the Act
The North Carolina General Assembly funded the Act with
one million dollars.93 The General Assembly earmarked $400,000to iplemnt te • 94
to implement the Project, and the NCOCOB will use $600,000 for
grants to nonprofit financial counseling agencies. In addition to
the legislated funding, the NCOCOB is willing to spend up to $1.5
million more "to hire additional professional and administrative
staff to assist struggling homeowners.""
IV. THE BENEFITS OF THE ACT TO NORTH CAROLINA'S
HOMEOWNERS AND LENDERS COMPARED WITH SIMILAR STATE
LAWS
North Carolina is not the only state that has enacted some
form of foreclosure prevention. 9 Certain aspects of the North
Carolina Act support subprime homeowners more than they are
supported in other states;98 others aspects promote the rights of
North Carolina's mortgage lenders more than in other
92. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 4; Current Operations and Capital Improvements
Appropriations Act of 2008, ch. 107, § 13.6B, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws (to be codified as
amended in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143C).
93. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 4; Current Operations and Capital Improvements
Appropriations Act of 2008 § 13.6B.
94. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 4; Current Operations and Capital Improvements
Appropriations Act of 2008 §§ 6.9A, 13.6B.
95. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 4; Current Operations and Capital Improvements
Appropriations Act of 2008 § 13.6B.
96. Vicki Lee Parker, Help Available in Foreclosure, NEWS & OBSERVER, Aug.
19, 2008, http://www.newsobserver.com/business/story/1183872.html.
97. N.C. Act, supra note 3. Other states' foreclosure prevention statutes
(including those that passed in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Washington state) may be more or less comprehensive than the
North Carolina Act or include measures that are covered elsewhere in the North
Carolina General Statutes. Still other jurisdictions (including Ohio and the city of
Philadelphia) have foreclosure prevention programs that were created by the
judiciary, not passed through the legislature. See infra notes 101-159 and
accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 165-167 and accompanying text.
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jurisdictions.99 Overall, the North Carolina Act balances the rights
of homeowners and mortgage lenders by seeking to stop
foreclosures and resolve the loan default in other, more mutually-
beneficial ways than foreclosure on the borrower's home.'00
A. Foreclosure Prevention Legislation in Various States
1. Delay or Moratorium on Foreclosure
Delay periods in foreclosure prevention statutes in other
states range from thirty days to a moratorium of five months,
compared to North Carolina's forty-five day delay period and
refusal of a moratorium. 11 Maryland's statute, passed in April
2008, created a five-month moratorium.102  New York requires a
ninety-day delay before initiating foreclosure proceedings.103
Several other state foreclosure prevention acts have created longer
delays before foreclosure than the forty-five day period in North
CarolinaY°4 Some other states, however, only require lenders to
99. See infra notes 168-173 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 160-164 and accompanying text.
101. Compare N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1 with Nicholas Confessore & Jeremy W.
Peters, A Proposal from Albany on Stemming Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/20/nyregion/20albany.html?scp=8&sq=Nichola
s+Confessore+%26+Jeremy+W.+Peters&st=nyt, and Manny Fernandez, In
Confronting the Foreclosure Crisis, a Bill Strikes a Balance, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/O6/22/nyregion/22housing.html?scp=l&sq=In+Co
n fronting+the+Foreclosure+Crisis% 2C+a+Bill+Strikes+a+Balance&st=nyt (noting
in both that New Yorkers considered, but did not pass, a year-long moratorium).
102. Cheyenne Hopkins, Foreclosure Moves Open Gray Area in Preemption, AM.
BANKER, Apr. 21, 2008, available at http://www.americanbanker.com/art
icle.html?id=20080418T813STMP&queryid=l 118817646&hitnum=l.
103. Act of Aug. 5, 2008, ch. 472, § 2, 2008 N.Y. Laws (to be codified as amended
in scattered sections of N.Y. BANKING LAW, N.Y. C.P.L.R., AND N.Y. REAL PROP.
AcTs. LAW ) [hereinafter N.Y. Act]; see also Fernandez, supra note 101 (describing
how the New York State Assembly originally passed the foreclosure prevention bill
with a one-year moratorium).
104. Compare N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1 with N.Y. Act, supra note 103, § 2 (New
York's ninety-day delay); Act of June 12, 2008, ch. 176, § 7, 2008 Conn. Acts (Reg.
Sess.) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8, 36)
[hereinafter Conn. Act] (Connecticut's sixty-day delay); Act of June 5, 2008, ch. 440,
§ 1, 2008 Colo. Sess. Laws 2258 (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-102.5)
[hereinafter Colo. Act] (Colorado's thirty-day delay to mail a notice, followed by an
additional thirty-day delay before filing a notice of election and demand); and Act of
Apr. 3, 2008, ch. 1, § 1, 2008 Md. Laws (to be codified at MD. CODE ANN., REAL
PROP. § 3-104) [hereinafter Md. Act] (Maryland's delay of ninety days after default or
forty-five days after filing intent to foreclose). Even the pilot program from the City
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wait thirty days to foreclose or bring other legal action after filing
a notice of intent .
While North Carolina's forty-five day delay may not allow
all homeowners to compile sufficient funds to stop foreclosure, it
still gives homeowners a warning without being so long that it
significantly disrupts the lenders' practices.' 6 Also, lenders often
oppose foreclosure moratoria because, as John M. Robbins,
chairman of the Mortgage Bankers Association explained, they
analyze every mortgage separately as "an individual transaction
and situation, one which needs to be addressed individually
between the lender and the borrower."'0 7 The North Carolina time
period strikes a good balance between homeowner and lender
interests.
2. Contact Information in Foreclosure Notice Mailing
Like the North Carolina Act, most states' laws require that
foreclosure notifications provide the homeowner with the name
and contact information of the lender and/or mortgage servicer so• 108
that the homeowner can attempt to renegotiate the loan. North
of Philadelphia has a longer window of delay than North Carolina: sheriff's sales in
the city were delayed for two months while the program was being created. The city
launched the pilot program in an effort to abate some of the 8,500 foreclosures that it
anticipates for 2008. FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA, COURT OF
COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, JOINT GENERAL COURT REGULATION
No. 2008-01, RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE DIVERSION PILOT PROGRAM,
http://fjd.phila.gov/pdf/regs/2008/cpjgcr-2008-Ol.pdf; Associated Press, Philly unveils
plan to fight home foreclosures, ABC NEWS, June 5, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/US/
wireStory?id=5003562.
105. Compare N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1 with Act of July 8, 2008, ch. 69, § 2, 2008
Cal. Adv. Legis. Serv. (Deering) (to be codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5)
[hereinafter Cal. Act] (California's thirty-day delay after contact with the borrower
or due diligence to contact the borrower) and Act of April 24, 2008, ch. 175, § 31,
2008 Ky. Acts (to be codified at KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 198A) [hereinafter Ky. Act]
(Kentucky's thirty-day delay).
106. See Hopkins, supra note 102.
107. Peter G. Miller, Should We Have a Foreclosure Moratorium?, REALTYTRAC,
http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/RealtyTracLibrary.aspx?a=b&ItemI
D=2268&accnt=64953 (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).
108. Compare N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1 with Conn. Act, supra note 104, § 7;
Colo. Act, supra note 104, § 1; Act of June 3, 2008, ch. 138, § 3, 2008 Haw. Sess. Laws
(to be codified at HAW. REV. STAT. § 667-5); Act of May 13, 2008, ch. 576, § 2, 2008
Ga. Laws (to be codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-7); and Md. Act, supra note 104,
§ 1. See also Save New Jersey Homes Act of 2008, ch. 86, § 6.a., 2008 N.J. Laws (to
be codified at N.J. REV. STAT. § 46) [hereinafter N.J. Act] (requiring the mailing to
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Carolina also recognizes that housing counselors can be influential
in lowering the occurrence of foreclosures,'09 and the Act requires
inclusion of contact information for at least one counselor in the
notice mailing." Similarly, legislation in New York and
Pennsylvania requires that the notice of the filing of foreclosure
also include contact information for governmental support and a
list of state-approved housing counselors."' North Carolina's law
encourages renegotiation by including in the foreclosure notice
contact information for counselors as well as for the homeowner's• 112
mortgage lender and/or mortgage servicer.
3. Housing Hotline
Several other states have created or authorized the creation
of housing hotlines online or by telephone to support, guide and
educate homeowners facing imminent foreclosure in finding other
options,"' much like the system instituted by North Carolina
Attorney General.
1 4
4. Negotiation Requirements between Homeowners and Lenders
Other jurisdictions have more detailed strategies for
renegotiation requirements than North Carolina's Project has
include a list of alternatives to foreclosure, "including any refinancing of the loan
offered by the creditor and any renegotiation of loan terms offered by the creditor").
109. Center for Community Capital director testifies about home foreclosures, UNC
CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CAPITAL, Feb. 26, 2008, http://www.ccc.unc.edu/?id=news.
022608&t=News.
110. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1.
111. N.Y. Act, supra note 103, § 2 (requiring the inclusion of the telephone
number and web address of the New York State Banking Department and a list of at
least five local consumer credit counseling agencies); Act of July 8, 2008, ch. 57, § 2,
2008 Pa. Laws (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of PA. CONS. STAT.)
[hereinafter Pa. Act] (requiring the inclusion of the name and telephone number of a
local consumer credit counseling agency).
112. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1. See also N.C. Foreclosure Help, www.ncfore
closurehelp.org (last visited Nov. 14, 2008) (compiling sources for government
assistance).
113. See N.Y. Act, supra note 103, § 1; Cal. Act, supra note 105, § 2; Act of June
16, 2008, Act 228, § 1, 2008 La. Acts (to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40:600.25.1) [hereinafter La. Act]; and Colo. Act, supra note 104, § 1.
114. Press Release, North Carolina Attorney General, supra note 47.
[Vol. 13
2009] NORTH CAROLINA HOME FORECLOSURES
promulgated to date.'15 The New York legislation requires lenders
and subprime borrowers to meet in settlement conference within
sixty days of serving the borrower with legal papers, after default
but before foreclosure, to discuss a renegotiation on the loan.
116
California requires its lenders to contact the borrowers to explore
options to avoid foreclosure."7 The City of Philadelphia requires a
court-monitored mediation."8  Other states recommend a
negotiation session, which may or may not be overseen by the
courts, but only require the negotiation for serious homeowners
seeking further assistance from the state."19 By contrast, the North
Carolina Act does not mandate a meeting between the
homeowner and lender or mortgage servicer; it puts the onus on
the homeowner to initiate the negotiation by providing the
homeowner with the servicer's or lender's contact information.2
5. Consumer Education Programs
Several states have created ongoing consumer education
programs to deal with the foreclosure crisis, although the methods
of consumer education vary.21 Pennsylvania has an ongoing
foreclosure study to monitor trends and provide for
recommendations. 22  A similar program in Kentucky promotes
consumer education by requiring lenders to include a brochure on
115. Compare N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1 with N.Y. Act, supra note 103, § 3; Pa.
Act, supra note 111, § 2; and Conn. Act, supra note 104, §§ 7, 16.
116. N.Y. Act, supra note 103, § 3.
117. Cal. Act, supra note 105, § 1.
118. FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA, COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
PHILADELPHIA COUNTY, JOINT GENERAL COURT REGULATION No. 2008-01,
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE DIVERSION PILOT PROGRAM, http://fjd.phila.
gov/pdf/regs/2008/cpjgcr-2008-01.pdf; Associated Press, supra note 104.
119. See, e.g., Pa. Act, supra note 111, § 2 (participation in a mediation program
will delay the lender's rights to initiate foreclosure for thirty-three days and may
delay for sixty days if the borrower seeks mortgage assistance payments); Conn. Act,
supra note 104, § 16 (the mediation program is mandatory for borrowers who wish to
seek emergency mortgage assistance payments); and THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO,
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM MODEL, http://www.supremecourtof
ohio.gov/dispute -resolution/foreclosure/foreclosureMediation.pdf (recommended by
the Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court for Ohio judges to follow in foreclosure
cases).
120. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1.
121. E.g., id.; Pa. Act, supra note 111, § 5; and Ky. Act, supra note 105, § 1.
122. Pa. Act, supra note 111, § 5.
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the consumer education center at the time of the mortgage."'
Illinois begins consumer education of homeownership in high
school, requiring lessons on "the basic process of obtaining a
mortgage and the concepts of fixed and adjusted rate mortgages,
subprime loans, and predatory lending. 12 4 Washington seeks to
educate its citizens "of all ages" about financial institutions and
products in order to provide them with "skills necessary to obtain
individual financial independence, fiscal responsibility, and
financial management skills., 125 Finally, North Carolina's Act will
use the Project to educate consumers through a media campaign in
television and internet advertisements.
126
6. Funding Requirements
A. FUNDING FOR CREDIT COUNSELORS
The North Carolina Act funds the nonprofit groups that
will serve as approved consumer credit counseling agencies. 7
Colorado, Connecticut and Washington have similar provisions.28
The Louisiana legislation granted permission for the creation of
the Louisiana Housing Finance Agency, which may, but is not• 129
required to, provide grants to counselors. The Kentucky
Homeownership Protection Center solicits donations for
funding. 13
123. Ky. Act, supra note 105, § 1.
124. Act of Aug. 19, 2008, ch. 863, § 5, 2007 Ill. Laws (to be codified at 105 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/27-12.1).
125. Act of Feb. 11, 2008, ch. 3, § 2, 2008 Wash. Legis. Serv. (West) (to be codified
at WASH. REV. CODE § 43.320) [hereinafter Wash. Act].
126. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1; N.C. Foreclosure Help, supra note 112 (including
a link to Public Service Announcements at http://www.foreclosurehelpandhope.
org/ad s.html).
127. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 4.
128. Conn. Act, supra note 104, § 14; Colo. Act, supra note 104, § 2; Wash. Act,
supra note 125, § 4.
129. La. Act, supra note 113, § 1.
130. Ky. Act, supra note 105, § 1.
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B. FUNDING FOR MORTGAGE ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS,
BONDS AND LOANS
North Carolina does not provide funding to homeowners,
although a few states do.' Michigan residents with annual
incomes at or below sixty percent of the statewide median gross
income who spend fifty percent of their finances on housing may
qualify for bonds from the state,13' and qualified citizens of
Pennsylvania and Connecticut may apply for loans to pay their
133mortgage.
7. Limits of the Legislation
A. LIMIT TO SUBPRIME LOANS ONLY
Some jurisdictions, including North Carolina, limit their
legislation to specific types of loans, and while each state defines
the covered mortgage loans differently, these subcategories of
loans all face great hardships, like subprime, nonprime, or high-
cost loans.134 The New York legislation defines subprime loans as
those that are 1.75 percentage points above the prevailing market
interest rate, and it does not enforce prepayment penalties in the
loans.135  The Kentucky legislation applies only to "high-cost
loans," which include the following factors: a principal amount
between $15,000 and $200,000; the borrower is a natural person;
the mortgage is used for a home for personal, family or household
purposes; the mortgage covers the borrower's principal dwelling;
and the total points and fees included with the loan are greater
than the greater of $3,000 or six percent of the value of the loan.
131. Compare N.C. Act, supra note 3 with Pa. Act, supra note 111, § 3; Conn. Act,
supra note 104, §§ 2,12; and Act of Apr. 2, 2008, Act 53, 2008 Mich. Pub. Acts (to be
codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 32a) [hereinafter Mich. Act].
132. Mich. Act, supra note 131.
133. Pa. Act, supra note 111, § 3; Conn. Act, supra note 104, §§ 2, 12.
134. E.g., N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1; N.Y. Act, supra note 103, § 2; Ky. Act, supra
note 105, § 31; Act of Jan. 8, 2008, ch. 471, 2008 Me. Laws (to be codified at ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A § 1-202).
135. N.Y. Act, supra note 103, § 2.
136. Ky. Act, supra note 105, § 31.
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The North Carolina Bankers Association notes that the Act
limits further damage on the North Carolina housing market
during the current economic downturn by limiting the application
of the Act to subprime loans.137 However, California's foreclosure
prevention legislation applies to any residential mortgages created
within the state between 2003 and 2007,138 and comparable
legislation in Maryland applies to any residential mortgage within
the state.39
B. TIME LIMITS FOR THE MORTGAGES COVERED BY
THE LEGISLATION
North Carolina limits the covered subprime loans to those
created in 2005, 2006 and 2007.140 Other jurisdictions also limit the
effect of their legislation to mortgages created within a certain
window, although the size of the time frame in other jurisdictions
appears larger than that used in North Carolina.14 ' The California
law applies to mortgages created from 2003 through 2007.142 The
New York legislation applies to mortgages created on subprime
loans between January 1, 2003, and September 1, 2008.143 The laws
in Maryland do not appear to indicate a time limit for subprime
loans, and its act extends prospectively."
137. Memorandum from the N.C. Bankers Ass'n to the Legal Memorandum
Mailing List, supra note 77.
138. Cal. Act, supra note 105, § 2.
139. Md. Act, supra note 104.
140. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1.
141. Compare N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1 with N.Y. Act, supra note 103, § 2; Cal.
Act, supra note 105, § 2; and Md. Act, supra note 104, § 3. Some New York
homeowners are concerned by the law's limitation because it will not necessarily
apply, like Maryland's law, to new mortgages created in the future. Fernandez, supra
note 101. North Carolina homeowners, with a window of applicable laws nine
months smaller than that in New York, may also become concerned by the Act's time
restrictions. However, for the foreseeable future, no subprime loans are likely to be
originated at all.
142. Cal. Act, supra note 105, § 2.
143. N.Y. Act, supra note 103, § 2.
144. Md. Act, supra note 104, § 3.
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C. EXPIRATION OF THE LEGISLATION
The North Carolina Act became effective on November 1,
2008, and expires on October 31, 2010.141 Other states' laws have
various expiration dates ranging from July 1, 2010 in Colorado to
January 1, 2013 in California.' 46 If the North Carolina Act proves
ineffective over the first two years, the state does not have a long-
term commitment to the program.47 If the Act is successful and
still needed, the NCOCOB may well lobby for its extension.
8. Additional Features Not Included in North Carolina's Act
Several other state foreclosure prevention laws include
features that were not part of North Carolina's Act. The features
discussed below relate specifically to the content of the Act but
were not included within it. Some other states' foreclosure
prevention laws also cover features that are addressed elsewhere
in the North Carolina General Statutes.48
A. NOTICES BEFORE INTRODUCTORY RATES RESET
The Save New Jersey Homes Act of 2008149 requires lenders
to provide written notices to homeowners sixty days and thirty
days in advance of resetting the introductory rate on an adjustable
rate mortgage. 5 ° The notices must include a list of alternatives to
foreclosure and information on the borrower's right to seek an
extension of the introductory rate."' New Jersey homeowners are
entitled to extend their introductory rate for an additional three
years if they complete a certification and meet other requirements
set out in the legislation, and they are not responsible for repaying
to the lender the interest that they would have been charged until
145. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 6.
146. Cal. Act, supra note 105, § 2; Colo. Act, supra note 104, § 2.
147. See N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 6.
148. See, e.g., Act to Regulate Mortgage Servicing, ch. 228, 2008 N.C. Sess. Laws
(to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-243.01).
149. N.J. Act, supra note 108.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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they sell their homes.'52 The North Carolina Act does not offer
this level of support to homeowners because it seeks a more
balanced approach to the foreclosure crisis, working to respect
lenders' rights while protecting homeowners.
B. LIMIT FREQUENCY OF DELAYS ON FORECLOSURE
Several other states limit how frequently homeowners may
take shelter in various aspects of the foreclosure prevention laws,
including the delay on foreclosure itself.' The ninety-day
foreclosure delay in New York is limited to once per twelve-month
period for the same mortgage and borrower, even if the borrower
has caught up in payments between occurrences of default.154 The
requirement to mail a notice to defaulting debtors in Colorado
only applies the first time that a debtor is in default in a twelve-
month period.' North Carolina does not impose any similar
limitations on debtors who default repeatedly within the year.
C. FINANCING MORTGAGE PAYMENTS
As mentioned above, several states finance loans or bonds
156to assist homeowners facing foreclosure. The North Carolina
Act, like the laws in most jurisdictions, does not offer financial
assistance to delinquent homeowners and only provides funding
for the training and compensation of the credit counselors and
agencies.157
D. REASONABLE BELIEF THAT THE MORTGAGOR CAN
REPAY
Some of the state laws that cover future mortgages require
the lender to show a reasonable belief that the mortgagor will be
152. Id. Accord State Issues: Subprime Legislation, SECURITIES INDUSTRY AND
FINANCIAL MARKETS ASS'N (SIFMA), Aug. 14, 2008, www.sifma.org/legislati
ve/state/subprime-legislation.html.
153. E.g., N.Y. Act, supra note 103, § 2; Colo. Act, supra note 104, § 1.
154. N.Y. Act, supra note 103, § 2.
155. Colo. Act, supra note 104, § 1.
156. See supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text.
157. Compare N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 4 with La. Act, supra note 113, § 1; Conn.
Act, supra note 104, § 14; and Colo. Act, supra note 104, § 2.
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able to repay the loan before the lender can offer a subprime
loan."5 8 The New York law goes even further, requiring that
mortgage lenders use a "duty of care" with a "reasonable and
good-faith" effort to find an appropriate rate on a mortgage for
each particular debtor and to determine whether a debtor will be
able to repay a loan.5 9 The North Carolina Act does not cover
future mortgages.
B. Benefits of the Act
The Act is designed to encourage negotiation between
homeowners and lenders so that homeowners will be able to
refinance or renegotiate mortgage loans in ways that are in the
best interest of all parties. 16° On its face, the Act balances the
needs of homeowners struggling to meet mortgage payments with
the rights of lenders to have their loans repaid or realize on the
collateral for the loans.'6' The benefit of the forty-five day delay is
that it warns debtors of impending foreclosures, which may allow
them to catch up their mortgage payments in time to avoid
foreclosure altogether. 162 This delay slows down the foreclosure
process to give homeowners more warning of an impending
foreclosure and to create more opportunities for lenders and
homeowners to come up with a better, mutually-beneficial plan
that does not involve foreclosure.163  Also, with the information
gathered through the filing system, the NCOCOB will be better
informed to combat loans that do "not meet the state's legal
standards."', 6
158. See, e.g., Conn. Act, supra note 104, § 23 (regulating a "nonprime home
loan"); Ky. Act, supra note 105, § 31 (regulating a "high-cost home loan").
159. N.Y. Act, supra note 103, § 6; accord Confessore & Peters, supra note 101;
Fernandez, supra note 101.
160. Press Release, N.C. Office of the Governor, supra note 2.
161. See N.C. Act, supra note 3.
162. See DATA REPORT No. 1, supra note 15, DATA REPORT No. 2, supra note 35.
163. See DATA REPORT No. 2, supra note 35.
164. Parker, supra note 96.
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1. Benefits to Homeowners
North Carolina's Act was created to protect homeowners.
The Act ensures that subprime homeowners are informed of their
rights by compelling lenders to notify them of impending
foreclosures forty-five days in advance of beginning the legal
action. It teaches the homeowners how to respond next by
requiring that lenders' correspondence include the contact
information for the mortgagee and servicer, as well as for housing
counselors within the state. In addition to the Act, the state
provides and funds a housing hotline' 6 as well as a website for
167consumer credit education.
2. Benefits to Lenders
At the same time, the Act is considerate of the needs and
rights of lenders by avoiding some of the more onerous provisions
supporting homeowners in other jurisdictions.' North Carolina
lawmakers did not consider a mortgage moratorium, as otherS 169
states have. While it encourages renegotiation, the Act does not
require homeowners and lenders to meet in court-supervised
sessions,7 ° nor does it provide additional funding to homeowners
facing impending foreclosure. 7 ' The Act does not require lenders
to notify homeowners repeatedly in writing before the interest
rates reset.' Finally, the Act is restricted to subprime loans, so it
does not affect foreclosure proceedings for mortgage loans in more
affluent spheres of North Carolina.73
165. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1.
166. Press Release, North Carolina Attorney General, supra note 47.
167. N.C. Foreclosure Help, supra note 112.
168. See N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1.
169. See, e.g., Confessore & Peters, supra note 101 (noting the failed New York
moratorium proposal); Hopkins, supra note 102 (discussing the Maryland
moratorium).
170. Compare N.C. Act, supra note 3 with N.Y. Act, supra note 103, § 3; Pa. Act,
supra note 111, § 2; and Conn. Act, supra note 104, § 16.
171. Compare N.C. Act, supra note 3 with Pa. Act, supra note 111, § 3; Conn. Act,
supra note 104, § 12; and Mich. Act, supra note 131.
172. Compare N.C. Act, supra note 3 with N.J. Act, supra note 108, § 5.
173. Compare N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1 with Cal. Act, supra note 105, § 2 and
Md. Act, supra note 104.
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V. INTERRELATION WITH FEDERAL LAWS
A. Potential Preemption of State Foreclosure Prevention
Statutes by the OCC and OTS
If state foreclosure prevention laws significantly disrupt
lenders' practices and rights to reclaim their loans through
foreclosure, then national lenders may increase pressure on
Congress to create a federal law to pre-empt state laws.
Generally, mortgages are governed by contract law at the state
level, but if state laws interfere with the collection processes and
rights of national banks or federal thrifts, federal regulators in the
OCC or Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) may create an
overarching rule in defense of the banks. '75 The 2004 OCC
preemption rule warns: "state laws that obstruct, impair, or
condition a national bank's ability to fully exercise its Federally
authorized real estate lending powers do not apply to national
banks.', 17 6  To date, however, federal regulators have not
preempted state foreclosure prevention laws."' The OCC
elaborated in the Federal Register that "any other law that the
OCC determines to interfere to only an insignificant extent with
national banks' lending authority or is otherwise consistent with
national banks' authority to engage in real estate lending would
not be preempted."'7 8 While the federal agencies maintain the
right in these policies to preempt any state foreclosure prevention
law, the moderate nature of North Carolina's Act should protect it
from federal preemption.
174. Hopkins, supra note 102.
175. Id.
176. Applicability of State Law, 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (2004).
177. Hopkins, supra note 102.
178. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed.
Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7 and 34).
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B. Federal Foreclosure Prevention Efforts
1. Federal Foreclosure Prevention Legislation
The federal government responded to the foreclosure crisis
before the North Carolina Act by passing the HOPE for
Homeowners Program in the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act "' on July 30, 2008. This voluntary program"8 was created
under the Federal Housing Administration "to allow homeowners
to avoid foreclosure by reducing the principle [sic] balance
outstanding, and interest rate charged, on their mortgages.
1 81
Then in October 2008, the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008182 was passed, which affects the
foreclosure crisis primarily through the federal government's
purchase of "troubled assets," a defined term in that act that
includes residential mortgages.18 ' Federal agencies that acquire
control over such mortgages (either wholly or in some form of
securities or investment) will encourage servicers' 8 to use the
HOPE for Homeowners Program "or other available programs to
minimize foreclosures,"'85 and "shall consent, where appropriate,..
. to reasonable requests for loss mitigation measures.' '8 6 When the
government owns a qualified residential mortgage outright, it will
implement a loan modification plan that "may include (A)
reduction in interest rates; (B) reduction of loan principal; and (C)
other similar modifications.'
87
The federal foreclosure prevention legislation passed in the
summer and fall of 2008' 8 does not preempt the North Carolina
Act. The federal laws coordinate well with the goals of and efforts
179. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, P.L. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654
(2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-23 (2008)).
180. Housing and Economic Recovery Act § 1715z-23(e)(4)(C).
181. Housing and Economic Recovery Act § 1715z-23(b)(2).
182. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat
2765 (2008) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 5202).
183. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 3(9).
184. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 110(c).
185. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 109(a).
186. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 109(c).
187. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 110(b)(2).
188. Housing and Economic Recovery Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1715z-23 (2008);
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act.
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behind North Carolina's Act. The Act's requirement that the
lender provide the homeowner with advance notice of foreclosure
and contact information for the lender should give the homeowner
the opportunity to learn about state and federal programs and
assistance that may be available.
2. Proposed Federal Foreclosure Prevention Legislation
The federal government is developing additional policies to
stem the increasing foreclosure rates. Federal agencies, led by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), are developing a
plan in which lenders that systematically modify their mortgage
loans according to government standards would receive the
government's guarantee to insure them if the modification failed. 189
The Working Group has encouraged the systematic approach to
renegotiation.'9 The plan echoes the method that the FDIC used
for systematically modifying delinquent mortgage loans at
IndyMac over the summer of 2008."' However, if this national
plan goes through, it would be implemented by the cooperation of
federal agencies, including the FDIC, Department of the Treasury
(Treasury), and Office of Management and Budget, and funded,
up to $50 billion, by the Treasury. 9' This plan also appears to
coordinate with the North Carolina Act and not preempt its
provisions, although until the plans are codified, it is impossible to
know exactly how it could interact with the provisions of the Act.
3. Voluntary Efforts by Lenders
Several national lending institutions are also considering
ways to decrease foreclosure rates by systematically modifying
189. Joe Adler, Plan to Guarantee Modified Mortgages Makes Headway, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 30, 2008, § Washington, at 1, available at http://www.ameri
canbanker.com/article.html?id=2008102924R6BH2K&queryid=489741752&hitnum=
1. Accord Holzer et al., supra note 23.
190. DATA REPORT No. 3, supra note 19, at 3.
191. Adler, supra note 189. Accord Moira Herbst, Foreclosures: Feds to the
Rescue? BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 30, 2008, http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dn
flash/content/oct2008/db20081029_246033.htm.
192. Adler, supra note 189. Accord Michael R. Crittenden & Jessica Holzer,
Relief Nears for 3 Million Strapped Homeowners, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2008, at A3.
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their loans' 9' and even instituting a foreclosure moratorium.94
These voluntary efforts have not yet been successful in slowing the
foreclosure rate across the country, but they may become more
influential as more lenders work to prevent foreclosures.
However, much like the enacted and proposed federal laws, these
measures will supplement and not override the efforts made by the
North Carolina Act to slow the foreclosure rate in the state.
VI. CONCLUSION
The North Carolina Act balances homeowners' rights with
lenders' rights through provisions that generally fall within the
range of what other jurisdictions' laws have done. 96 One such
provision is the Act's requirement for lenders to wait for forty-five
days after notifying homeowners of an impending foreclosure, in
between some states' thirty-day waiting period and others' sixty-
or ninety-day period. 97 Another example is the Act's expiration
date: it falls four months after the expiration of the Colorado
legislation, but several years before California's act expires in
2013.198 The law also proves its moderation by measures that are
not included. By not restricting the forty-five day delay before
filing a foreclosure to once per twelve-month period, as some
jurisdictions have done, North Carolina is more permissive of
193. Robin Sidel, Massive Effort to Save Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122549543952589677.html (noting that major lending
institutions, including J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., Bank of America Corp., and
Wachovia Corp. (now a subsidiary of Wells Fargo & Co.) are systematically
modifying or planning to systematically modify their delinquent mortgage loans);
Ruth Simon, Citi to Modify Terms for U.S. Mortgages, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122636776229916053.html (reporting on modifications
planned by Citigroup Inc.).
194. Simon, supra note 193 (noting that Citigroup, Inc. is not pursuing foreclosures
that it has started for over 16,000 homeowners).
195. Holzer et al., supra note 23.
196. Compare N.C. Act, supra note 3 with, e.g., N.Y. Act, supra note 103; Cal. Act,
supra note 105; Conn. Act, supra note 104; Colo. Act, supra note 104; Ky. Act, supra
note 105; and Md. Act, supra note 104.
197. Compare N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1 with N.Y. Act, supra note 103, § 2; Cal.
Act, supra note 105, § 2; Conn. Act, supra note 104, § 7; Colo. Act, supra note 104, §
1; Ky. Act, supra note 105, § 31; and Md. Act, supra note 104, §§ 3, 7.
198. Compare N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 6 with Cal. Act, supra note 105, § 2 and
Colo. Act, supra note 104, § 2.
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delinquent homeowners than other states.! However, by limiting
the additional thirty-day extension to one time per homeowner,
the Act is stricter than others.200 The Act would probably better
reflect and respond to the realities of mortgage delinquencies if it
had limited foreclosure delays to once a year but allowed more
than one extension per homeowner. Nonetheless, the provisions
that the Act does contain balance what homeowners and lenders
would each prefer.
North Carolina's moderation may protect homeowners
more than it appears. Because the Act is considerate of lenders'
rights, it does not encourage federal preemption to support lenders
that other, more homeowner-focused acts might. 20 Furthermore,
some acts may have gone so far to protect homeowners that they
may end up harming homeowners as well as failing to protect
lenders.20 2 For example, representatives from Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac have indicated that they will not buy New York
subprime loans because of the costs and risks that come to them as
purchasers from the additional regulation: That disclosure
concerned mortgage brokers in New York who feared that other,
smaller banks would also be hesitant, if not entirely unwilling, to
take the mortgages because they doubt that they would have any
opportunity to sell them.204 This scenario could not occur under
North Carolina's Act, both because its provisions are more
supportive of lenders and because it does not apply to mortgages
created after 2007. In that way, the moderation of the North
Carolina Act makes it more beneficial to homeowners overall.
North Carolina has made a noble step toward alleviating
one of the greatest economic harms of this decade by dealing
directly with the problem of foreclosures, especially in subprime
mortgages. The Act protects homeowners and lenders alike by
seeking to avoid foreclosures, allowing homeowners to keep their
199. E.g., N.Y. Act, supra note 103, § 2, Colo. Act, supra note 104, § 1.
200. N.C. Act, supra note 3, § 1.
201. Bob Tedeschi, Shying Away from N.Y. Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2008, at
RE9, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/realestate/O7mort.html?scp=l&
sq=shying%20away%20from%20NY%201oans&st=cse.
202. E.g., N.Y. Act, supra note 103.
203. Tedeschi, supra note 201.
204. Id.
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homes and equity, and permitting lenders to negotiate another
option to receive their payments that may be more beneficial and
lucrative in the long run than repossessing the home. Whether the
Act will reduce foreclosures dramatically in North Carolina
remains unclear at this time, but the Act contains moderate
provisions that are not as extreme as in other jurisdictions. While
the Act's provisions do not go as far toward supporting
homeowners as some other jurisdictions' laws do, the North
Carolina Act protects and provides guidance to homeowners while
not diverging substantially from lenders' rights and goals. The Act
also works well in conjunction with federal legislation and
proposals to ease the foreclosure crisis. North Carolina's Act
looks as though it will be a strong measure to reduce many of the
foreclosures that the state otherwise would have faced by 2010.
CAROLYN E. WALDREP
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